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Grappling with the Meaning of 
“Testimonial” 
Richard D. Friedman† 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Crawford v. Washington1 has adopted a testimonial 
approach to the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment.  
Under this approach, a statement that is deemed to be 
testimonial in nature may not be introduced at trial against an 
accused unless he has had an opportunity to cross-examine the 
person who made the statement and that person is unavailable 
to testify at trial.  If a statement is not deemed to be 
testimonial, then the Confrontation Clause poses little if any 
obstacle to its admission.2  A great deal therefore now rides on 
the meaning of the word “testimonial.” 
  
 † Ralph W. Aigler Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School; 
rdfrdman@umich.edu.  I comment further on questions related to the topic of this 
paper on The Confrontation Blog, www.confrontationright.blogspot.com.  I have filed a 
petition for certiorari in Hammon v. State, 829 N.E.2d 444 (Ind. 2005), petition for cert. 
filed (U.S. Aug. 5, 2005) (No. 05-5705), one of the cases discussed in this article.  
Though my views on the confrontation right continue to evolve, I do not believe I have 
been led to any of the views expressed in this article by the fact of this representation.  
A draft of the article completed long before I undertook the Hammon representation is 
available on The Confrontation Blog, http://confrontationright.blogspot.com (Feb. 16, 
2005, 17:18 EST). 
 1 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 2 Id. at 68 (“Where nontestimonial hearsay is at issue, it is wholly consistent 
with the Framers’ design to afford the States flexibility in their development of hearsay 
law – as does Roberts, and as would an approach that exempted such statements from 
Confrontation Clause scrutiny altogether.”).  As far as I am aware, only one post-
Crawford decision has held, with respect to a statement that was not excluded by the 
governing hearsay rules, that the statement was not testimonial and yet was barred by 
the Confrontation Clause – and there the trial court’s error in admitting the statement 
was deemed harmless.  State v. Lawson, No. COA04-564, 2005 WL 2276520, at *3-5 
(N.C. Ct. App. Sept. 20, 2005).  In Miller v. State, 98 P.3d 738, 748 (Okla. Crim. App. 
2004), the court also found a statement to be non-testimonial yet violative of the 
Confrontation Clause, but it appears that the Miller court reached the confrontation 
issue without deciding whether the rule against hearsay would require exclusion.  
Moreover, at least arguably, the courts in both of these cases applied unduly narrow 
views of the meaning of “testimonial.”  My thanks to Andrew Fine for alerting me to 
both cases. 
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Those of us who previously advocated the testimonial 
approach thus find ourselves in a position somewhat like that 
of an opposition politician who suddenly wins election and has 
to deal with the realities of government.  It is relatively easy to 
carp from the outside about what is wrong with the old regime, 
to present an alternative approach in general terms, and to 
offer a few illustrations of how that approach may work in real 
situations.  Actually resolving the daily flood of issues as they 
arise may be considerably more difficult.  Before Crawford, the 
prevailing doctrine was the unsatisfactory rule of Ohio v. 
Roberts,3 under which the key question for confrontation 
purposes was whether the statement should be deemed 
sufficiently reliable to warrant admissibility.4  In that context, 
it was possible to advocate a wholesale doctrinal 
transformation and adoption of a testimonial approach without 
going into too much detail as to what “testimonial” means.  But 
now that Crawford has adopted the testimonial approach, 
actual cases must be decided under it, and many of them.  
Pretty quickly, we are going to have to get to a much fuller 
understanding of the meaning of “testimonial.”5 
Of course, the analogy cannot be pushed too far.  
Crawford, unlike many elections, did not put anybody in power 
who was not already.  Academics, commenting from the 
sidelines, have neither the opportunity nor the responsibility to 
decide cases.  But I believe the transformation achieved by 
Crawford was correct, and I want it to succeed.  I am therefore 
happy to take this opportunity to reflect at some length on the 
question of what statements should be deemed testimonial for 
Confrontation Clause purposes.  I cannot offer in this article a 
resolution for every possible situation posing an issue of 
whether a statement should be deemed testimonial.  Rather, I 
hope to present a broad conceptual approach to the meaning of 
“testimonial” and an overview of how several critical issues in 
construing the term should be resolved. 
  
 3 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
 4 Id. at 66. 
 5 Chief Justice Rehnquist said as much in his separate opinion in Crawford, 
541 U.S. at 75 (“[T]he thousands of federal prosecutors and the tens of thousands of 
state prosecutors need answers as to what beyond the specific kinds of ‘testimony’ the 
Court lists . . . is covered by the new rule.  They need them now, not months or years 
from now.”) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).  Prompt answers would, of course, be useful 
to judges, defense lawyers, defendants, and other participants in the criminal justice 
system – including the police officers who conduct initial interviews – as well as 
prosecutors. 
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Many of my arguments stem from one central insight, 
which can be summarized this way:  Many courts and 
commentators have attempted to define testimonial by starting 
at a core of statements that includes trial testimony and then 
working outwards.  But this is a bad approach because the 
whole point of the confrontation right is to bring testimony to 
trial, or some other formal proceeding.  
Parts II and III of this article develop this thought.  In 
Part II, I contend that the purpose of the Confrontation Clause 
is to assure that prosecution testimony be given under 
prescribed conditions, most notably that it be in the presence of 
the accused and subject to cross-examination.  Part III 
examines the tendency of some courts, in determining whether 
a statement is testimonial for purposes of the Clause, to ask 
whether the statement bears a set of characteristics resembling 
trial testimony.  Rather, I argue, the courts should ask whether 
the statement fulfills the function of prosecution testimony.  
That function, in rough terms, is the transmittal of information 
for use in prosecution. 
Parts IV through VI address the question of the 
perspective that should be used in determining whether a 
statement is testimonial.  Part IV argues that the critical 
question is not the purpose for which the statement was given 
or taken.  Rather, the basic question is one of reasonable 
anticipation at the time the statement was made – whether at 
that time it appeared reasonably probable that the statement 
would be used in prosecuting or investigating crime.  As 
discussed in Part V, it is a matter of secondary, though still 
substantial, importance whether the test is objective or 
subjective – that is, whether it depends on the actual 
expectation of the given actor or on the expectation of a 
reasonable person in the position of that actor.  Part VI argues 
that whether a statement is testimonial must be determined 
from the perspective of the person who made it – the witness. 
Parts VII, VIII, and IX examine several considerations 
that may support the conclusion that a statement is 
testimonial, but the absence of any one or more of which does 
not mean that a statement is not testimonial.  Thus, a 
statement can be testimonial even if it is (a) not made to a 
government agent; (b) made at the initiative of the witness, 
rather than in response to interrogation; or (c) made in an 
informal setting.  Part X argues that a statement may be 
testimonial even if it is made in great excitement shortly after 
the event in question.  Lastly, I discuss the difficult problem of 
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child declarants in Part XI.  Some very young children should 
perhaps be considered too undeveloped to be capable of being 
witnesses.  In the case of children who are capable of being 
witnesses, how to determine whether the given statement is 
testimonial may often depend on whether a subjective or 
objective approach is used. 
At the outset, it may be useful to comment on the 
intellectual orientation of this article.  My aim is to develop a 
conception of the Confrontation Clause that is theoretically 
sound, that can be implemented practically, and that leads to 
sensible results that are defensible and, at least for the most 
part, intuitively appealing.  I try to get to that point from both 
ends, theoretical and practical.  To some extent I support 
particular doctrinal approaches by arguing that as a matter of 
principle they are superior, and to some extent I do so by 
showing how they lead to satisfactory results.  Both aspects, I 
believe, are essential.  An argument from principle alone might 
be radically indeterminate and could prove to be most 
unsatisfactory when set in the crucible of actual cases.6  An 
argument based only on results would lack any connecting 
thesis and so would hardly have any predictive or persuasive 
power. 
II. THE CONDITIONS OF TESTIMONY 
If a system of adjudication is to depend in large part on 
the testimony of witnesses – which any rational system 
ultimately does – then almost by definition it must determine 
the conditions under which testimony may be given.  That is, 
an adjudicative system would hardly warrant that designation 
if it provided: 
Anybody who wishes to testify against a criminal defendant may do 
so however she wishes.  She may, for example, do so in open court, 
but if she does not wish to testify in that way she may make a 
statement to the police, or submit a written statement or a videotape 
directly to the court, or she may make a statement to a friend with 
the understanding that the friend will relay it to court. 
One can imagine, because it has happened, different 
rules for giving testimony.  For example, many systems, but 
  
 6 See, e.g., State v. Wright, 701 N.W.2d 802 (Minn. Aug. 11, 2005), discussed 
at The Confrontation Blog, http://confrontationright.blogspot.com (Aug. 18, 2005 09:29 
EST) (purporting to apply a broad definition of the term testimonial, but yielding a 
very narrow conception). 
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not all, have insisted that testimony be given under oath.7  A 
system might provide, as the later Athenians did, that 
testimony be written and placed into a sealed container, thus 
allowing the parties to know before trial what the body of 
evidence would be.8  Or it might provide, as many Continental 
courts have done, that testimony must be recorded out of the 
presence of the parties, to prevent intimidation.9  The English 
took another course, one that the Hebrews,10 the earlier 
Athenians,11 and the Romans12 had followed: They insisted that 
witnesses give their testimony “face to face” with the adverse 
party.  This practice was not universally followed, especially in 
politically charged cases, but by the middle of the seventeenth 
century it was firmly established even in that context.  By then 
it was also clear that the defendant could question the witness.  
And even before then, and for long after, English commentators 
proudly proclaimed this method of giving testimony as one of 
the chief superiorities of the English system of criminal justice 
over its Continental counterparts.13  The practice took on even 
greater significance in America, where the importance of 
defense counsel and cross-examination became established 
sooner.  Shortly after declaring independence, the American 
states made the practice a right protected by their 
constitutions, and in 1791, in the Sixth Amendment, so did the 
United States.14 
  
 7 See, e.g., Helen Silving, The Oath, 68 YALE L.J. 1329 (1959) (discussing the 
history of the oath in various judicial systems). 
 8 STEPHEN TODD, THE SHAPE OF ATHENIAN LAW 128-29 (1993); 2 
DEMOSTHENES,  PRIVATE ORATIONS 46:6, at 247-49 (A.T. Murray trans. 1939).  (“The 
laws . . . ordain that [a witness’s] testimony must be committed to writing in order that 
it may not be possible to subtract anything from what is written, or to add anything to 
it.”). 
 9 Richard D. Friedman & Bridget McCormack, Dial-In Testimony, 150 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1171, 1202-03 (2002) [hereinafter Friedman & McCormack, Dial-In]. 
 10 Deuteronomy 17:6, 19:15-18; Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation: The 
Search for Basic Principles, 86 GEO. L.J. 1011, 1022-23 & n.64 (1998) [hereinafter 
Friedman, Search]. 
 11 Stephen Todd, The Purpose of Evidence in Athenian Courts, in NOMOS: 
ESSAYS IN ATHENIAN LAW, POLITICS AND SOCIETY 19, 29 (Paul Cartledge et al. eds., 
1990). 
 12 Acts 25:16 quotes the Roman governor Festus as declaring: “It is not the 
manner of the Romans to deliver any man up to die before the accused has met his 
accusers face to face, and has been given a chance to defend himself against the 
charges.”  See Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1015-16 (1988).  
 13 See Friedman, Search, supra note 10, at 1023-24 n.69. 
 14 See Friedman & McCormack, Dial-In, supra note 9, at 1206-07; Randolph 
N. Jonakait, The Origins of the Confrontation Clause: An Alternative History, 27 
RUTGERS L.J. 77, 112-16 (1995) (arguing that before the Sixth Amendment, several 
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Several points from this brief historical review bear 
emphasis.  First, the inquiry under the Confrontation Clause is 
not best conceived in the terms that some writers (including 
myself) have used, as a determination of what hearsay – some, 
but less than all – should be excluded as a matter of 
constitutional law.  The right articulated by the Confrontation 
Clause predated the development of the hearsay rule, and it 
has existed in adjudicative systems that do not have a rule 
resembling our rule against hearsay.  The confrontation right 
is really a fundamental rule of procedure, providing that if a 
person acts as a witness against an accused then the accused 
has a right to confront her.  To act as a witness means to 
testify, or to make a testimonial statement; although the 
English words “witness” and “testimony” do not resemble each 
other, their counterparts in many other languages come from 
the same root and show the near identity between the two.15  
Thus, to make the question of whether a statement is 
testimonial, the key criterion in applying the Confrontation 
Clause is not merely a matter of choosing a convenient term 
that will help distinguish between categories of hearsay.  If a 
statement is testimonial, then the maker has acted as a 
witness, and so the statement is within the purview of the 
Confrontation Clause.  If the statement is not testimonial, 
there may nevertheless be good reasons to exclude it – the lack 
of an opportunity to cross-examine the declarant may be a 
significant factor weighing in favor of exclusion – but the 
statement is simply not within the scope of the Confrontation 
Clause.  
Second, the Confrontation Clause is a guarantee rather 
than merely a prohibition.  Crawford said that “the principal 
evil at which the Confrontation Clause was directed was the 
civil-law mode of criminal procedure, and particularly its use of 
ex parte examinations as evidence against the accused.”16  That 
is correct in the sense that the civil-law method was the one 
most salient to the Framers:  It had been used in some English 
and American courts and the Framers and their forebears 
found it highly objectionable.  But certainly the Confrontation 
  
states adopted provisions protecting the confrontation right, as well as other 
procedural rights, as a result of the adversarial nature of American trials). 
 15 For example, a witness in French is un témoin, and testimony is 
témoignage; in German, the words are zeuge and zeugnis. The French translation can 
be found at Babel Fish Translation, http://babelfish.altavista.com/.  The German 
translation is available at LEO English/German Dictionary, http://dict.leo.org/.  
 16 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 50 (2004). 
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Clause did not mean to provide that any method of giving 
testimony would be acceptable, so long as it did not resemble 
the civil-law method.  It did not mean, for example, to endorse 
the later Athenian method of putting testimony in written form 
in a pot that was kept sealed until trial; nor did it mean to 
allow a witness to use a trusted confidante as a conduit for 
passing her testimony on to court.  Had the Confrontation 
Clause been meant only to prohibit a given form of procedure, 
it could have been written to do so; there are many such 
clauses in the Constitution,17 including in the Bill of Rights.18  
But the Confrontation Clause is an affirmative guarantee; it 
ensures that “the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him.”19  If a given 
procedure for presenting the testimony of a witness does not 
provide that right, it violates the Clause, no matter how 
dissimilar that procedure may be to the civil-law method.  
Thus, courts that, like State v. Davis,20  treat a statement as 
per se non-testimonial if it “cannot accurately be described as 
an ex parte examination or its functional equivalent”21 apply 
too narrow a conception of what statements are testimonial. 
Third, the view presented here means that the 
conundrum that plagues originalist views of the Constitution in 
other contexts – trying to determine what rule the Framers 
prescribed for a situation that they could not anticipate – really 
is not a problem with respect to the Confrontation Clause.  No 
matter how unfamiliar a given type of hearsay may have been 
to the Framers, the originalist question posed by the Clause is 
a simple one: Would admitting this statement against the 
accused amount to allowing a witness to testify against him 
without being subjected to confrontation?  I do not mean to 
advocate originalism as a dominant principle of constitutional 
interpretation, but only to say that in this particular context it 
works quite well.  The passage of more than two centuries has 
not substantially altered our insistence that prosecution 
witnesses give testimony by one prescribed method – under 
  
 17 Note, for example, the Bill of Attainder Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. 
 18 Note, for example, the Fifth Amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 19 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 20 111 P.3d 844, 850 (Wash. 2005), petition for cert. filed (U.S. Jul. 8, 2005) 
(No. 05-5224). 
 21 Id. at 850. 
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oath, face-to-face with the accused, and subject to cross-
examination.22 
III. A FUNCTIONAL RATHER THAN DESCRIPTIVE APPROACH 
Part II has shown that there are many ways in which 
prosecution testimony could be given, but that the 
Confrontation Clause insists on one – face-to-face with the 
accused and subject to cross-examination.  It therefore makes 
no sense to determine whether a statement is testimonial by 
asking whether the statement shares key characteristics with 
trial testimony.  The very point of the Clause is to ensure that 
testimony will be given at trial, or at some other proceeding 
that maintains the essential attributes of trial testimony.  To 
say that a statement is beyond the reach of the Confrontation 
Clause because the circumstances in which it was given do not 
resemble a trial therefore turns logic on its head.  It means 
that the more that a statement fails to satisfy the conditions for 
testimony prescribed by the Confrontation Clause, the less 
likely the Clause will address the problem. 
Thus, a characteristic-based approach to the question of 
what is testimonial – that is, one that depends on whether the 
statement has similar characteristics to trial testimony – lacks 
logic and historical foundation.  A critical practical factor also 
weighs decisively against it.  If certain characteristics are 
deemed crucial for treating a statement as testimonial, then 
repeat players involved in the creation or receipt of prosecution 
evidence will have a strong incentive, and often ready means, 
to escape that treatment, simply by avoiding those 
characteristics.  We have seen this already.  Some courts have 
indicated that even if a statement made knowingly to the police 
accuses a person of a crime, it is not testimonial unless it is the 
product of a formal interrogation conducted after the police 
have determined that a crime has been committed.23  Some 
  
 22 New technologies have presented the troubling issue of whether 
confrontation requires that the witness and the accused always be in the same room 
with each other.  See, e.g., Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 851 (1990); Richard D. 
Friedman, Remote Testimony, 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 695 (2002) (commenting  on 
proposal to allow testimony from a remote location).  But even to the extent the answer 
is negative, the change created by sometimes allowing testimony from a remote 
location is a relatively small alteration of the traditional procedure for presenting 
testimony.  
 23 E.g., State v. Alvarez, 107 P.3d 350, 355-56 (Ariz. 2005); State v. Hembertt, 
696 N.W.2d 473, 483 (Neb. 2005), petition for cert. filed (U.S. Aug. 19, 2005) (No. 05-
5981). 
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courts have held that, so long as the police can be deemed to 
have been assessing and securing the scene, even a statement 
making an express criminal accusation is not testimonial.24  As 
a result, we have seen police advised to try to secure accusatory 
statements before beginning what would necessarily be deemed 
a formal interrogation.25  
These difficulties are all solved if, instead of relying on a 
pre-determined checklist of characteristics, the determination 
of whether a statement is testimonial depends on whether it 
performs the function of testimony.  That approach allows the 
Confrontation Clause to perform its historically-supported 
function, assuring that however testimony has been given it 
will be proscribed unless it satisfies the demands of the Clause.  
And it deprives repeat players of the ability or incentive to 
manipulate because they cannot change the status of a 
statement under the Clause by shaping the circumstances in 
which the statement is given unless they defeat their own 
purposes by depriving the statement of testimonial value. 
This approach does, of course, require the articulation of 
what the testimonial function is, and then implementation of 
that standard.  I will concentrate here on the first step.  A 
useful articulation, I believe, is that a statement is testimonial 
if it transmits information for use in litigation.  In the context 
of importance to the Confrontation Clause, this usually means 
that the statement transmits information for use in a criminal 
prosecution.26  (I am using “for” as a shorthand; as explained 
  
 24 E.g., Hembertt, 696 N.W.2d, at 483; Hammon v. State, 829 N.E.2d 444, 
457-58 (Ind. 2005), petition for cert. filed (U.S. Aug. 5, 2005) (No. 05-5705); Spencer v. 
State, 162 S.W.3d 877, 882 (Tex. Ct. App. 2005). 
 25 Sample Crawford Predicate Questions, VOICE (APRI’s Violence Against 
Women Program, Alexandria, Va.), Nov. 2004, at 8-9, available at http://www.ndaa-
apri.org/pdf/the_voice_vol_1_issue_1.pdf (proposing that police officers be asked 
predicate questions at trial such as: “Were the statements taken during ‘the course of 
an interrogation’?” “Were your questions to her an interrogation or merely part of your 
initial investigation?”; “Were these questions asked in order to determine whether a 
crime had even occurred?”). 
 26 This is not inevitable, though.  At the argument of Crawford, Justice 
Kennedy posed this interesting hypothetical: Criminal charges are brought arising 
from a serious auto accident, and the prosecution offers a statement made shortly after 
the accident by an observer to an insurance investigator.  The statement could clearly 
be characterized as testimonial with respect to civil litigation, whatever the 
consequences of such a characterization might be.  Should it be considered testimonial 
for purposes of the Confrontation Clause?  Transcript of Oral Argument at 5, Crawford, 
541 U.S. 36 (Nov. 10, 2003), 2003 WL 22705281 (No. 02-9410).  I believe it should, even 
without requiring proof that the declarant anticipated a criminal prosecution.  In other 
words, given that the declarant made the statement in anticipation of litigation, it 
probably should be considered testimonial as a general matter, and therefore also for 
Confrontation Clause purposes, even without a showing that the declarant anticipated 
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below, I do not believe the statement needs to have been made 
for the purpose of aiding a criminal prosecution to be deemed 
testimonial.)27 
Note that “use in a . . . prosecution” is a somewhat 
looser wording than, say, “use as evidence at trial” (which 
resembles a wording I have used on at least one occasion28).  
Two reasons justify this choice.  First, I think it is better as a 
matter of principle.  A great deal of criminal procedure occurs 
before trial – the vast majority of cases never go to trial – and 
evidence provided to the authorities can be useful to them and 
help them secure a conviction long before trial.  The trial is 
when the confrontation right can most often be invoked – in 
fact, this is a great deal of what makes a trial, given that the 
confrontation most often occurs in the presence of the fact-
finder – but the information may have performed its 
inculpatory function well beforehand.  Indeed, it seems the 
confrontation right should be independent of a right to trial.  
Even if there were no proceeding recognizable as a trial – even 
if all testimony were recorded and delivered piecemeal behind 
  
use in prosecution.  An alternative and plausible rule would require a demonstration 
that the declarant anticipated prosecutorial use.  In most cases, I suspect, such a 
showing could be made: If the circumstances were serious enough to warrant 
prosecution, and the declarant’s statement aided that prosecution, the declarant, or a 
reasonable person in the position of the declarant, would probably have anticipated 
that prosecution was a significant possibility. 
 27 Also, I will not explore beyond this footnote the question of what 
prosecution will satisfy this definition.  Does the defendant have to be identified at the 
time of the statement?  Not necessarily; it may be apparent when a statement is made 
that it is likely to be useful to the prosecution, perhaps in proving that a crime has in 
fact been committed, even though the perpetrator has not yet been identified.  What if 
the statement is made with one crime in mind and is later introduced at a trial for a 
later-committed crime?  If there is a substantial link between the two, that should 
probably be enough; I have in mind the cases in which a statement is made in the 
context of an incident of domestic violence, and the complainant is later murdered.  
Forfeiture doctrine would often nullify the confrontation right in this context, though.  
See, e.g., People v. Giles, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d 843, 847-48 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) review 
granted, 102 P.3d 930 (Cal. 2004).  Does any crime have to have been committed yet?  
Not necessarily: here I have in mind the cases in which an eventual murder victim, 
fearing her assailant, tells a confidante information to be used in the event that he 
does in fact assault her and render her unable to testify.  See State v. Cunningham, 99 
P.3d 271, 274 (Or. 2004).  Again, forfeiture is probable in this situation. 
 28 See Friedman, Search, supra note 10, at 1039 (asserting ambiguously that 
if “the declarant correctly understands that her statement will be presented at trial” 
the statement is testimonial, but that it is not testimonial if “the declarant correctly 
understands at the time she makes the statement that it will play no role in any 
litigation”). Cf. Friedman & McCormack, Dial-In, supra note 9, at 1240-41 (suggesting 
as a workable standard: “If a statement is made in circumstances in which a 
reasonable person would realize that it likely would be used in investigation or 
prosecution of a crime, then the statement should be deemed testimonial.”). 
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closed doors to a fact-finder – the accused should have a right 
to confront the witnesses. 
Second, this approach has the practical advantage of 
helping us avoid a bothersome Catch-22.  Suppose the 
governing doctrine makes admissibility at trial the critical 
factor determining whether a statement is testimonial.  
Suppose also that the jurisdiction assiduously protects the 
confrontation right.  This means that it will exclude testimonial 
statements (unless the accused has had an opportunity to 
cross-examine and the declarant is unavailable).  But then a 
statement that otherwise would be testimonial will not be 
under the hypothetically governing law – for the very reason 
that it is inadmissible at trial and so cannot be testimonial 
under that law.  But then if it is not testimonial it presumably 
could be admitted . . . and so on.  One could construct a 
complicated contingent question to try to avoid this infinite 
regress.  It is far simpler, though, to avoid the whole problem 
simply by speaking in terms of use of the information in 
prosecution generally rather than specifically at trial. 
IV. ANTICIPATED USE 
I have contended that, in rough terms, testimony is the 
transmittal of information for use in prosecution.  Necessarily, 
then, the determination of whether a statement is testimonial 
examines the situation as of the time the statement is made.  A 
standard that labeled a statement as testimonial because it 
was actually used in prosecution would make no sense; it would 
mean that any out-of-court statement offered by the 
prosecution at trial to prove the truth of what it asserts – that 
is, any hearsay – is testimonial. 
To determine whether a statement is testimonial, 
therefore, we must figuratively stand at the time of the 
statement and look forward in time towards the prosecutorial 
process.  Now, let us assume for the sake of argument a point 
that I will try to demonstrate in Part VI, that in doing so we 
should take the perspective of the declarant, the purported 
witness.  And for the moment I will assume also that in taking 
that perspective it is the actual state of mind of the witness – 
rather than the state of mind of an hypothesized reasonable 
person – that matters.  The question I will address here is what 
state of mind is necessary for the statement to be deemed 
testimonial. 
252 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:1 
It may be tempting to conclude, as some courts have 
done, that the statement is testimonial only if it was made for 
the purpose of transmitting information to be used in 
prosecution.29  But of course people often make statements for 
multiple purposes, and so this test would immediately raise the 
question of how important that purpose must be for the 
statement to be deemed testimonial: The dominant purpose?  A 
purpose?  Something in between, such as a decisive, but-for 
purpose, absent which the statement would not have been 
made?  I think none of these should be the test.  Instead, the 
question is whether the declarant understood that there was a 
significant probability that the statement would be used in 
prosecution.  In other words, the test is one of anticipation; one 
might speak of it as an intent test, but only in the soft sense 
that a person is deemed to have intended the natural 
consequences of her actions. 
I believe this anticipation test is preferable to a purpose 
test for several reasons.  First, as a matter of principle, it 
better describes the testimonial function.  Suppose, to put aside 
for the moment several other issues, a witness gives a 
statement to the police describing the commission of a crime in 
circumstances like those of Crawford.  If the statement is made 
in the station house in response to formal and structured 
questioning by the police, it is undeniably testimonial.  The 
reason, I believe, is that the witness must have understood (as 
did the police) that the statement was transmitting 
information for use in prosecution.  This conclusion would 
remain the same even if we found out that the witness only 
gave the statement under pressure, because she thought doing 
so would help her own status with the authorities; or that, 
feeling personal sympathy with the defendant, she hoped even 
while making the statement that it would never be used; or 
that she made the statement primarily for the purpose of 
personal catharsis, or expiation, or to secure her immediate 
personal safety.  In each case, this other purpose would have 
been sufficient to explain her conduct even if use of the 
statement in prosecution were not a possibility.  In short, 
  
 29 See, e.g., Hammon v. State, 829 N.E.2d 444, 457 (Ind. 2005), (“If the 
declarant is making a statement to the police with the intent that his or her statement 
will be used against the defendant at trial, then the statement is testimonial. 
Similarly, if the police officer elicits the statement in order to obtain evidence in 
anticipation of a potential criminal prosecution, then the statement is testimonial.”), 
petition for cert. filed (U.S. Aug. 5, 2005) (No. 05-5705).   
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understanding of the probable evidentiary use, rather than 
desire for that use, is what makes the statement testimonial.  
Second, as a practical matter, the inquiry into 
anticipation is much easier than an inquiry into motivation.  
Anticipation depends on, and can be proven by, external 
circumstances; motivation demands a more searching 
psychological inquiry. 
Third, a test framed in terms of anticipation can be 
applied on an objective basis.  In Section V, immediately 
following, I will assess the relative merits of a subjective test, 
which looks to the actual state of mind of the actor, and an 
objective test, which looks to the state of mind of an 
hypothesized reasonable person in that actor’s position.  Both 
types of test have their merits, but I think it is clear that most 
courts prefer an objective test.  If the test is one of anticipation, 
it can be applied objectively (What would a reasonable person 
in that position have anticipated?) as well as subjectively 
(What did this declarant anticipate?).  But if the test is one of 
motive, it would be hard to apply it coherently except 
subjectively, on the basis of the witness’s actual motivations.  
To answer the question of what would have motivated a 
reasonable person who acted as the declarant did in the 
declarant’s position would require positing not only the base of 
knowledge of that hypothetical person but also a set of values; 
that makes for an inquiry that is at best very complex. 
V. SUBJECTIVE OR OBJECTIVE? 
Again, I will assume for now that the perspective of the 
witness is the crucial one.  In Part IV, I have argued that 
anticipation of use in prosecution is the crucial question.  But 
in answering this question, should we take a subjective or 
objective view?  That is, should we ask whether this particular 
declarant anticipated use in prosecution, or should we ask 
whether a reasonable person in the position of the declarant 
would anticipate such use? 
In most cases, I do not think the choice makes very 
much difference.  Assuming the test is a subjective one, a court 
would still perforce often determine what the declarant’s 
anticipation was by relying largely on surrounding 
circumstances.  In other words, the court would infer that the 
declarant did (or did not) anticipate use in prosecution from its 
perception that a reasonable person in the declarant’s position 
would (or would not) anticipate such use. 
254 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:1 
The subjective approach has the advantage of 
theoretical simplicity; the objective approach, but not the 
subjective approach, requires a court to determine both a set of 
characteristics that it will assume a reasonable person has in 
this context and a set of criteria defining what it means to be in 
the declarant’s position.  The subjective approach is also more 
intellectually straightforward: It is easier to explain why a 
statement should be deemed testimonial given that the person 
who actually made the statement anticipated prosecutorial use 
than to explain why the statement should be deemed 
testimonial given that a mythical person who might be quite 
different from the actual declarant would have anticipated 
such use. 
On the other hand, because it does not entail an inquiry 
into the actual declarant’s state of mind, the objective approach 
is more likely to yield some categorical rules, and to the extent 
reasonable rules could be crafted, that would be a welcome 
development.  Not all situations lend themselves to categorical 
rules, or at least not to simple categorical rules – 911 calls 
reporting an assault while the assailant is still nearby provide 
a good example.30  But some situations do.  For example, I 
believe that a statement describing an assault made after the 
assailant has left to a police officer responding at the scene 
should, if an objective test is used, be deemed testimonial as a 
categorical matter. 
Even though it is theoretically more complex, therefore, 
the objective approach is probably simpler in actual 
implementation, and this factor appears to have made it more 
attractive to courts.  An objective approach is, as I have argued 
in Part IV, more easily compatible with a definition of 
testimonial that depends on the anticipation of a reasonable 
declarant than with a definition that depends on such a 
declarant’s motivation.  Apart from this, the chief consequence 
of the choice between an objective and subjective approach may 
well be in the context of child witnesses.  As I shall show in 
Part XI, an objective approach would tend to characterize more 
statements by children as testimonial than would a subjective 
approach. 
  
 30 See infra Part X. 
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VI. THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE WITNESS 
I have argued in Part IV that anticipation of use in 
prosecution is the key question in determining whether a 
statement is testimonial.  But whose anticipation?  The 
declarant’s?  Governmental authorities’?31  Both – so that a 
statement is not deemed testimonial unless both the declarant 
and governmental authorities anticipate use in prosecution?  
Either – so that a statement is deemed testimonial if either the 
declarant or governmental authorities anticipate use in 
prosecution?  I will contend here that it is the perspective of the 
declarant – the witness – that matters.  (For simplicity of 
expression, I will speak here as if it is the actual anticipation of 
the declarant that is material – that is, that a subjective test is 
used – though the test could be objective or subjective, as 
discussed in Part V.)  In this Part, I will contend that the fact 
that governmental authorities are gathering evidence for use in 
prosecution does not make a statement testimonial if the 
declarant does not understand that this is happening.  In Part 
VII, I will argue that if the declarant does anticipate that the 
statement will be used in prosecution, that is sufficient, even if 
the statement was not made to a governmental agent.  In 
short, government involvement in the production of the 
statement is neither sufficient nor necessary to make the 
statement testimonial. 
This is a contentious area.  I will approach it first by 
showing that making the intentions or anticipation of 
government agents the dispositive consideration, or a sufficient 
factor to characterize the statement as testimonial, would lead 
to some unappealing results – and unappealing in particular to 
one arguing from a pro-prosecution perspective.  A statement 
by a co-conspirator of the defendant, made for the purpose of 
furthering the conspiracy but to an undercover police agent, 
was clearly admissible under pre-Crawford law.  I suspect that 
the Supreme Court would be loath to adopt any theory that 
would entail a change in this result.32  But if the intention of a 
government agent to gather evidence for use in prosecution is 
  
 31 With respect to governmental authorities, it would not much matter 
whether the test were phrased in terms of purpose or anticipation; it would rarely 
occur that a government agent would take a statement with the anticipation, but 
without the purpose, that the statement be used in prosecution. 
 32 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 13-14, Crawford, 2003 WL 22705281 
(No. 02-9410). 
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the critical consideration, then such a statement is clearly 
testimonial, for that is precisely what the agent is trying to do.  
So what makes the statement non-testimonial?  Clearly it is 
that the declarant did not anticipate a prosecutorial use of the 
statement. 
Similarly, consider the cases in which police intercept 
calls to a drug or gambling house, either by answering the 
telephone and playing the role of an order-taker or by 
monitoring an answering machine; the callers, unaware that 
they are speaking to the police, place their orders or make 
communications otherwise indicating their awareness of the 
business performed at the house.  The American cases were in 
consensus before Crawford that these utterances are 
admissible,33 and that is the proper result.  But any attempt to 
contend that the police are not gathering evidence for use in 
prosecution would be utterly unconvincing.  Assuming such an 
utterance is deemed to be a statement offered to prove the 
truth of what it asserts, the reason the statement is not 
testimonial is that the declarant did not anticipate 
prosecutorial use.34 
These examples suggest that an intention on the part of 
a government agent to gather evidence for prosecutorial 
purposes does not in itself make a statement testimonial.  And 
as a theoretical matter I believe this conclusion is right. 
Police and other government agents gather evidence for 
prosecutorial purposes from many different sources.  Think of 
three categories.  Category 1 includes sources of information 
other than communications by humans – blood, maggots, 
bloodhounds, DNA tests, skid marks, and so forth.  The police 
may, for prosecutorial purposes, observe a phenomenon of 
evidentiary significance, and even generate one, but plainly 
this type of evidence poses no Confrontation Clause problem.  
By contrast, Category 2 includes statements made to 
government investigators by declarants who know the 
investigators are gathering evidence for prosecutorial purposes.  
This type of evidence seems clearly to be testimonial within the 
  
 33 See, e.g., United States v. Oguns, 921 F.2d 442, 448-49 (2d Cir. 1990); 
United States v. Long, 905 F.2d 1572, 1579-80 (D.C. Cir. 1990); United States v. Zenni, 
492 F. Supp. 464, 465, 469 (E.D. Ky. 1980); People v. Nealy, 279 Cal. Rptr. 36, 38-39 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1991). 
 34 Cf. People v. Morgan, 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d 224, 233 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) 
(treating utterances as hearsay within an exception and holding that admission did not 
violate Confrontation Clause because – among other, spurious, grounds – of “their 
unintentional nature”). 
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meaning of the Confrontation Clause.  Category 3 includes 
statements made by humans who do not realize that their 
audience is a government investigator gathering evidence for 
use in prosecution; the classic example is that of a conspirator 
making a statement to an undercover police officer.  I contend 
that for Confrontation Clause purposes evidence in Category 3 
is more like evidence in Category 1, from non-human sources, 
than like evidence in Category 2, the self-conscious testimonial 
statement.  The critical factor distinguishing Category 2 from 
Category 1, and also from Category 3, is that only in Category 
2 is the source cognizant of the likely prosecutorial use of the 
statement. 
A skeptic may contend that the critical factor 
distinguishing Category 1 from Category 2 is that one cannot 
usefully attempt to cross-examine a maggot or a bloodhound, to 
say nothing of a vial of blood or a skid mark.  If that were so, 
Category 3 would materially resemble Category 2 more than 
Category 1.  And it may seem at first that this view is correct, 
because of course if a statement is testimonial for 
Confrontation Clause purposes it cannot be admitted against 
the accused unless he has had an opportunity to cross-examine 
the declarant.  Nevertheless, I believe this view is wrong.  For 
at least two reasons, the ability of the declarant to be cross-
examined is not the hallmark of what makes a statement 
testimonial for Confrontation Clause purposes. 
First, there is more to confrontation than cross-
examination; though cross-examination has taken on greater 
importance over time, historically the core of the right, as its 
name suggests, has been the right of the accused to demand 
that prosecution witnesses testify in his presence.35  And even 
now that is an essential aspect of the right.36  Yet no 
  
 35 See Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1016 (1988) (“[T]here is at least some room 
for doubt (and hence litigation) as to the extent to which the Clause includes those 
elements [the right of cross-examination and restriction on admissibility of out-of-court 
statements], whereas . . . simply as a matter of English it confers at least a right to 
meet face to face all those who appear and give evidence at trial.”) (internal citations 
omitted).  Although early Athenian witnesses testified orally at trial, the right to cross-
examine appears not to have been invoked frequently.  Todd, supra note 8, at 29.  Note 
also the declaration of the Roman governor Festus, Acts 25:16, supra note 12, which 
insisted on the accuser being brought face-to-face with the accused but says nothing 
about questioning the accuser.  See also Friedman, Search, supra note 10, at 1024-25 
n.74 (noting a period in trial of treason cases in which witnesses were brought before 
the accused but he was not allowed to question them directly). 
 36 See Statement of Scalia, J., 535 U.S. 1159, 1160 (2002) (explaining reasons 
for joining majority decision not to transmit to Congress proposed amendment to 
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confrontation problem is posed by, say, the fact that the 
accused was not present when the chemicals used in a DNA 
test were generating their evidence – even though the test was 
performed by government agents for the purpose of producing 
evidence for prosecution and it would be possible to demand the 
accused’s presence. 
Second, that cross-examination was never possible does 
not relieve a Confrontation Clause problem if a human 
statement is testimonial.  Corpses cannot be cross-examined 
any more than bloodhounds or maggots can.  Suppose that the 
prosecution takes the deposition of a witness – clearly a 
testimonial statement – and just before cross-examination is 
about to start the witness dies of a heart attack, through 
nobody’s fault.  If the prosecution offers the deposition 
transcript at trial, and the accused objects on confrontation 
grounds, the prosecution could not validly contend, “Cross-
examination is not possible now and it never was possible.  It is 
therefore silly to exclude this evidence on the basis that the 
accused has not had an opportunity for cross-examination and 
that in some imaginable state of the world he might have had 
such an opportunity.”  The court would rule in effect, “Sorry.  
This evidence doesn’t satisfy the conditions for proper 
testimony.  I understand that it was impossible to satisfy those 
conditions.  But that’s your tough luck.”  Courts could say 
something like that when the prosecution wants to prove the 
reaction of a bloodhound: “Sorry.  Cross-examination is not 
possible.  I know there is nothing you can do or could have done 
to make it possible, but given that it is not possible, this 
evidence just doesn’t satisfy the conditions for testimony.”  But 
of course courts do not do that; though in exposing the 
bloodhound to a bloody shirt the police were trying to secure 
evidence for use in prosecution, what the bloodhound did by 
barking is evidence that was solicited by the police, but it is not 
testifying within the meaning of the Confrontation Clause. 
  
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 26(b) that would have allowed testimony from a 
remote location, subject to cross-examination, in a limited set of circumstances): 
As we made clear in [Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 846-47 (1990)], a 
purpose of the Confrontation Clause is ordinarily to compel accusers to make 
their accusations in the defendant’s presence – which is not equivalent to 
making them in a room that contains a television set beaming electrons that 
portray the defendant’s image. Virtual confrontation might be sufficient to 
protect virtual constitutional rights; I doubt whether it is sufficient to protect 
real ones. 
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And why not?  It appears that the essence of testifying 
is provision of information understanding there is a significant 
probability it will be used in prosecution.  The bloodhound 
lacks the understanding to make his bark testimonial – and so 
does the conspirator or the unwitting drug customer.  Without 
such understanding on the part of the source of information – 
whether that source is a human declarant or not – all we can 
say is that a phenomenon occurred, one that was observed or 
perhaps even generated by government agents.  But that does 
not make the evidence testimonial.  If, by contrast, the source 
of the information is a human who does understand its likely 
use, we can say that she was playing a conscious, knowing role 
in the criminal justice system, providing information with the 
anticipation that it would be used in prosecution – and that 
certainly sounds a lot like testifying.  Furthermore, without 
such understanding on the part of the declarant, the situation 
lacks the moral component allowing the judicial system to say 
in effect, “You have provided information with the knowledge 
that it may help convict a person.  If that is to happen, our 
system imposes upon you the obligation of taking an oath, 
saying what you have to say in the presence of the accused, and 
answering questions put to you on his behalf.”37 
In sum, the fact that evidence is created through the 
participation of a government agent does not make the 
evidence testimonial.  The conduct of the purported witness 
must be testimonial in nature.  A conspirator going about his 
routine conspiratorial business is not performing a testimonial 
act, nor is a drug or gambling customer placing an order.  To be 
testimonial, it must appear from the perspective of the witness 
that the statement is transmitting information that will, to a 
significant probability, be used in prosecution. 
VII. STATEMENTS NOT MADE TO GOVERNMENTAL AGENTS 
Part VI has shown that government involvement is not 
sufficient to make a statement testimonial.  But is it necessary?  
I believe the answer is negative.  That a statement is made to a 
government agent is often a factor supporting a conclusion that 
  
 37 See Sherman J. Clark, An Accuser-Obligation Approach to the 
Confrontation Clause, 81 NEB. L. REV. 1258 (2003) (viewing the Confrontation Clause 
as giving the accused not merely the right to confront the witnesses but primarily the 
right to demand that the witnesses against him assume the burden of confronting 
him). 
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the statement is testimonial.  But there is no requirement that 
the statement be made to such an agent.  If the declarant 
anticipates that the statement, or the information asserted in 
it, will be conveyed to the authorities and used in prosecution, 
then it is testimonial, whether it is made directly to the 
authorities or not. 
Once again I will argue both from consequences and 
from theory.  A rule providing that a statement is not 
testimonial unless it is made directly to government agents 
would have some consequences that I believe are intolerable.  A 
witness who did not want to undergo the rigors of cross-
examination could presumably send a statement to the court, 
in writing or other recorded form:  “Here’s what I have to say.  
Please read it at trial; I don’t want to come in person.”  If that 
statement were considered testimonial – on a theory that the 
court is a government agent, and all that is necessary is that 
such an agent receive the statement directly, not that the agent 
play a role in procuring the statement – the reluctant witness 
would still have an easy alternative.  She could simply make a 
statement to a friend and ask the friend, as her agent, to pass 
the statement on to the authorities or directly to court; even if 
the friend had to testify subject to cross-examination, that 
would probably not be a hardship, because she would only be 
testifying that the reluctant witness made the statement. 
In many cases the witness would not even have to take 
the initiative.  I think it is not only plausible but virtually 
inevitable that, if a government agent standard is established 
by the courts, private victims’ rights organizations will provide 
a comfortable way for many complainants to create evidence for 
use in prosecution without having to confront the accused: 
“Make a videotape, and then go on vacation.  We’ll bring the 
tape to court and present the testimony necessary to get the 
tape shown to the jury.  Don’t worry, you never have to look the 
accused in the eye, you never have to answer questions by his 
attorney, and you don’t even have to take an oath.”  How can 
the making of that videotape not be considered testimonial? 
Similarly, if a dying murder victim says to a private 
person nearby, “Jack shot me!”  I do not believe the statement 
is made for the edification or amusement of the listener; clearly 
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it is made to help bring the assailant to justice, and that makes 
it testimonial.38 
These examples suggest that government involvement 
in the creation of a statement is not necessary to make the 
statement testimonial.  History lends further support to the 
point.  The confrontation right predates the existence of 
government prosecutors or police.  As I mentioned in Part II, 
the Hebrews, the early Athenians, and the Romans all 
protected the right of the accused to confront the witnesses 
against him.  In England, state prosecutors did not become the 
norm for ordinary crime until the nineteenth century,39 but the 
right to confront was established long before; indeed, in the 
sixteenth century Thomas Smith described the criminal trial as 
an “altercation” between accuser and accused.40  If today a 
jurisdiction were to eliminate state prosecutors, returning to a 
system in which crime was privately prosecuted, I do not 
believe we would say that this change virtually nullified the 
confrontation right, allowing a private prosecutor or his agent 
to gather statements from observers and report them all in 
court. 
Moreover, it makes no sense conceptually to say that a 
statement must be made to a government agent for it to be 
deemed testimonial.  Granted, there is language in Crawford 
emphasizing prosecutorial abuse.41  But it must be remembered 
that it is not prosecutorial authorities who violate the 
Confrontation Clause.  Certainly the authorities do not violate 
the Clause when they take a statement behind closed doors 
from a witness.  We expect the police to take confidential 
statements; often they would be derelict in their investigatory 
duty if they did not do so.  The violation of the Clause occurs 
when a testimonial statement is admitted at trial against an 
accused without his being afforded an opportunity to confront 
the witness.  The prosecutor may be said to be complicit in the 
violation, because presumably it was the prosecutor who 
sought admissibility.  But it is the court that commits the 
violation by deciding to admit the statement notwithstanding 
  
 38 The statement may nevertheless be admissible, preferably on the basis 
that the accused forfeited the confrontation right, but that is another matter. 
 39 J.M. BEATTIE, CRIME AND THE COURTS IN ENGLAND 35-36 (1986). 
 40 THOMAS SMITH, DE REPUBLICA ANGLORUM 114 (Mary Dewar ed., 
Cambridge Univ. Press 1982) (1583) (describing a typical criminal trial). 
 41 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 55 n.7 (“Involvement of government 
officers in the production of testimony with an eye toward trial presents unique 
potential for prosecutorial abuse . . . .”). 
262 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:1 
the lack of confrontation.42 Once again, if we imagine a world 
without prosecutors, this time a world in which the court 
gathers evidence against the accused, that should not mean the 
destruction of the confrontation right; Alice should not be 
allowed to testify, “Barbara chose not to come here today, but 
she asked me to relay to you her rendition of what she saw at 
the crime scene.” 
I am only arguing that there is no per se rule that a 
statement cannot be testimonial unless it is made to a 
government agent; the bottom line question is what the witness 
anticipated.  In some cases, as suggested by the examples I 
have given above, the anticipation of prosecutorial use is clear 
even though the statement is made to a private person.  In 
other cases, there will be no good basis for inferring such an 
anticipation.  And clearly, when the statement is made to a 
prosecutorial agent, that will often be a strong basis for 
drawing an inference that the declarant anticipated that the 
statement would be used in prosecution.  Sometimes, indeed, 
the agent will announce this intention.  But even if she does 
not, in some contexts the likely use is obvious from the nature 
of the statement and the open presence of a government officer.  
“Our neighbor parked his car strangely yesterday” said to one’s 
spouse, when nothing else unusual appears to have happened, 
will probably be characterized as a “casual remark to an 
acquaintance.”43  But now suppose that what prompted the 
statement was this question by a police officer: “We’re 
investigating a murder in the neighborhood.  Did you notice 
anything strange yesterday?”  Then the statement seems 
plainly testimonial. 
A rule refusing to deem a statement to be testimonial 
unless it was made to a government agent might be mitigated 
by stretching the meaning of “government agent.”  Suppose a 
calm, collected statement to a privately employed 911 operator 
describing a crime that occurred several hours before.  Perhaps 
  
 42 The court is a state actor, and so the decision to admit the statement 
constitutes state action, a necessary element under the Fourteenth Amendment, which 
makes the Confrontation Clause applicable to the states. See generally ERWIN 
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:  PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 486 (2d ed. 2002) 
(summarizing the so-called “state action” doctrine:  “The Constitution’s protections of 
individual liberties and its requirement for equal protection apply only to the 
government [though the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition of slavery should be 
excepted from this broad statement].  Private conduct generally does not have to 
comply with the Constitution.”). 
 43 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51. 
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the 911 operator may be considered a government agent 
because the company that employs her is under contract with 
government agencies.  Or consider an emergency room doctor, 
who regularly receives and passes on to the authorities victims’ 
descriptions of crimes.  Perhaps she, too, can be considered a 
government agent, even if she is not a public employee, because 
she is under a legal obligation to report the statement.  But 
such manipulations are not a satisfactory resolution of the 
problem because they require generous use of the term 
“government agent” and because they cannot reach all 
situations in any event.  It would be far better to acknowledge 
frankly that in some circumstances a statement may be 
testimonial even though it is not made directly to a government 
agent. 
VIII. INTERROGATION44 
Since Crawford, some courts have said that a statement 
is not testimonial unless it is made in response to 
governmental interrogation.45 And indeed, some have gone 
further, refusing to characterize a statement as testimonial 
unless it meets a restrictive definition of interrogation as 
“structured police questioning.”46  This idea has begun to 
distort police practices, as police try to act in such a way that 
prosecutors can later argue that statements made to the police 
were not in response to interrogation.47 
I believe that the whole supposed interrogation 
requirement is entirely mistaken.  Interrogation – like the 
participation of a government agent in the making of a 
statement – is a factor that in some contexts supports an 
inference that the statement is testimonial, but the statement 
may be testimonial even though it is not in response to 
interrogation.  
  
 44 I have adapted this Part from an entry called “The Interrogation Bugaboo” 
that I posted on The Confrontation Blog, http://confrontationright.blogspot.com/ (Jan. 
20, 2005, 1:12 EST). 
 45 E.g., United States v. Webb, No. DV-339-04, 2004 WL 2726100, at *2-4 
(D.C. Super. Ct. Dec. 22, 2004); People v. Bryant, No. 247039, 2004 WL 1882661, at *1 
(Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 24, 2004), appeal held in abeyance by 697 N.W.2d 527 (Mich. 
2005). 
 46 E.g., State v. Barnes, 854 A.2d 208, 211-12 (Me. 2004); People v. Newland, 
775 N.Y.S.2d 308, 309 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004), leave to appeal denied, 817 N.E.2d 835, 3 
N.Y.3d 679, and 821 N.E.2d 981, 3 N.Y.3d 759 (2004). 
 47 See Sample Crawford Predicate Questions, supra note 24. 
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Those who contend that interrogation is necessary for a 
statement to be deemed testimonial have language they can 
point to in Crawford, though it is quickly apparent that the 
language does not really support them.  Sylvia Crawford’s 
statements were made in response to police interrogation, and 
the Court held that, whatever else the category of testimonial 
statements might include, statements made in response to 
police interrogation certainly fall within it.  Here are the 
passages in question, with emphasis added in each case: 
[E]ven if the Sixth Amendment is not solely concerned with 
testimonial hearsay, that is its primary object, and interrogations by 
law enforcement officers fall squarely within that class.48 
Statements taken by police officers in the course of interrogations 
are also testimonial under even a narrow standard.  Police 
interrogations bear a striking resemblance to examinations by 
justices of the peace in England.49 
Whatever else the term covers, it applies at a minimum to prior 
testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a 
former trial; and to police interrogations.  These are the modern 
practices with closest kinship to the abuses at which the 
Confrontation Clause was directed.50 
There is no indication, then, that statements not made 
during formal testimonial events – a preliminary hearing, 
grand jury or a former trial – must be in response to police 
interrogation to be considered testimonial.  The Court was very 
clear that it was merely listing a core class of testimonial 
statements, a class that plainly includes the statements at 
issue in the Crawford case itself, and was deciding no more 
than that these statements are testimonial.  Left for another 
day was the question of what additional statements, if any, 
shall be considered testimonial.  It is true that the Court left 
open the possibility that it will not consider any statements 
beyond this core class to be testimonial.  Indeed, the fact that 
the Court took the care, in footnote 4, to offer some elaboration 
on the meaning of “interrogation”51 confirms that the Court 
preserved the possibility that the term would in some 
  
 48 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53 (emphasis added). 
 49 Id. at 52 (emphasis added). 
 50 Id. at 68 (emphasis added). 
 51 There the Court said that it was using the term in a colloquial sense, that 
it did not have to choose among definitions, and that “Sylvia’s recorded statement, 
knowingly given in response to structured police questioning, qualifies under any 
conceivable definition.”  Id. at 53 n.4. 
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circumstances be decisive.  But that is as far as the Court went 
in this direction.  It offered no intimation that a statement not 
made in response to interrogation would not be considered 
testimonial.  And it certainly did not suggest that if a 
statement was not “knowingly given in response to structured 
police questioning” it would not be testimonial; it merely said 
that a statement meeting that standard “qualifies under any 
conceivable definition.”52 
So Crawford does not tell us that a statement must be 
in response to interrogation to be characterized as testimonial.  
And common sense tells us that there is no such requirement.  
Suppose that at trial a prosecutor or the court issues a general 
invitation:  “Anyone who knows anything about this incident, 
please feel free to come to the front of the courtroom and tell us 
what you know.”  After Observer does so, the prosecutor says, 
“Thank you.  You may go.”  Alertly, defense counsel objects 
because of a lack of confrontation.  “But,” says the prosecutor, 
“this was no witness.  I did not subject her to any 
interrogation.”  The prosecutor is right that there was no 
interrogation, but of course we would expect the legal 
argument to be rejected sneeringly.  What Observer was doing 
was testifying.  It does not matter that her statement was not 
given in response to questions; nor would it matter whether it 
was she or the prosecutor or the court who took the initiative in 
arranging for her to give the testimony. 
Now suppose the invitation comes not at trial but at the 
police station:  “Ms. Observer, if you care to make a statement, 
please feel free to do so.  I will videotape it, and when this 
perpetrator stands trial I will give the prosecutor the tape so 
that she can play it in front of the jury.”  I think it is equally 
obvious that a statement made in response to this invitation is 
testimonial.  And now suppose an observer walks into the 
police station and says, “You don’t know about a crime that has 
been committed, but I am now going to tell you, and I expect 
that you will then want to prosecute.  Please record what I am 
about to say, because I expect you will want to use it at trial – I 
do not like the idea of being under oath and having to answer 
questions by some aggressive defense lawyer.”  I cannot see a 
plausible basis on which this statement should not be deemed 
testimonial.  Or suppose the observer walks into the police 
  
 52 Id. 
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station with an affidavit completed, describing the crime.  Does 
anyone seriously contend that this is not testimonial? 
Of course, the statements in these hypotheticals are 
more formal than in the usual case, in which a witness makes a 
statement to a police officer in the field, perhaps before the 
officer is confident that a crime has been committed.  But, for 
reasons that I will analyze in Part IX, formality is not required 
to render a statement testimonial.  If the declarant in that field 
situation understands full well that once the officer receives 
the statement it is likely to be used for prosecutorial purposes, 
then the statement is testimonial.  The declarant is creating 
evidence – and this critical reality is unaffected by the facts 
that (1) until the moment the statement was made, the police 
officer was not confident that a crime had been committed, and 
(2) structured questioning by the officer was not necessary to 
secure the statement. 
The bottom line is that if the declarant is making the 
statement in a situation warranting a reasonable anticipation 
of prosecutorial use, it is testimonial, even if it is made without 
questioning by government authorities or entirely on the 
witness’s own initiative.  Interrogation may, however, be a 
significant factor in indicating that a reasonable person in the 
position of the declarant would have this anticipation; if the 
authorities are interrogating, that is a factor that would often 
convey to the declarant the likelihood of prosecutorial use.  But 
when the declarant is reporting a crime, this factor is not 
necessary to characterize the statement as testimonial; she 
knows that she is conveying to the authorities information 
about a crime, and presumably she understands that they will 
use that information to invoke the machinery of criminal 
justice.  To hold that such a statement is not testimonial is 
merely to try to avoid Crawford because it makes prosecutions 
more difficult. 
IX. FORMALITY53 
Some cases have indicated that a statement cannot be 
considered testimonial for purposes of the Crawford inquiry 
  
 53 I have adapted this Part from an entry called “The Formality Bugaboo” 
that I posted on The Confrontation Blog, http://confrontationright.blogspot.com/ (Jan. 
2, 2005, 12:55 EST). 
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unless it was made formally.54  Once again, I believe this view 
represents a misunderstanding of Crawford, and of the basic 
approach to the confrontation right that Crawford reflects. 
Again, courts adopting this rule can find some language 
in Crawford to cite in their support, though ultimately, once 
again, the attempt is unavailing.  First, drawing on a definition 
given by Noah Webster, Justice Scalia wrote that testimony “is 
typically ‘[a] solemn declaration or affirmation made for the 
purpose of establishing or proving some fact.’”55  Second, 
Justice Scalia then offered this contrast: “An accuser who 
makes a formal statement to government officers bears 
testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual remark 
to an acquaintance does not.”56  Third, one of the three 
formulations of the class of testimonial statements presented 
by Justice Scalia is the one adopted by Justice Thomas (with 
Justice Scalia himself joining) in his separate opinion in White 
v. Illinois: “extrajudicial statements . . . contained in formalized 
testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior 
testimony, or confessions.”57 
Even on their face, none of these three passages adopts 
a formality rule.  The Court did not say that testimony must be 
a solemn declaration; it said that testimony typically is such a 
declaration.  The two polar categories, “a formal statement to 
government officers” and “a casual remark to an acquaintance,” 
plainly do not exhaust all possibilities, and so presenting these 
two does not indicate where the boundary between testimonial 
and non-testimonial lies.  As for the Thomas formulation, it is 
only one of three alternatives presented by the Court, and the 
only one that includes a formality rule.  Moreover, it is not 
clear whether Justice Thomas regards confessions as being a 
subset of “formalized testimonial materials”; if so, it is not clear 
why, because confessions can be very informal, and if not, it is 
not clear why the two sets, “formalized testimonial materials” 
and “confessions,” should be deemed to constitute the overall 
class of testimonial statements. 
  
 54 E.g., People v. Jimenez, No. B164534, 2004 WL 1832719, at *11 (Cal. Ct. 
App. Aug. 17, 2004), review denied, 2004 WL 1832719 (Nov. 17, 2004), cert. denied, 125 
S. Ct. 1713 (2005). See also Mungo v. Duncan, 393 F.3d 327, 336-37 n.9 (2d Cir. 2004) 
(dictum). 
 55 541 U.S. at 51 (quoting 1 NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF 
THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828)).  
 56 541 U.S. at 51. 
 57 Id. at 51-52 (citing White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992) (Thomas, J., 
concurring)). 
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In short, nothing in Crawford compels the conclusion 
that only formal statements can be deemed to be testimonial.  
And courts should not adopt such a rule, most importantly 
because it makes no sense.  Consider this exchange:58 
Police Officer:  Please have a cup of coffee and make yourself 
comfortable.  If that chair is too hard, please let me know and I’ll get 
you a cushion. 
Witness:  Thanks so much.  The chair is fine, but I’d love some milk 
if you have it. 
Officer:  Sure.  Here you go.  You know, I’m collecting evidence for 
the trial of Suspect on robbery charges.  I know you’ll find it 
inconvenient and unpleasant to testify in court, so why don’t you tell 
me everything you remember, and then I’ll tell the jury everything 
you’ve told me.  We can do this very informally.  In fact, I’m not even 
going to take notes.  So just start talking whenever you’re ready. 
Witness:  OK. Well, I was just walking down Main Street, minding 
my own business . . .  
It seems to me clear that this statement is testimonial.  
Clearly, Witness is making a statement with the anticipation 
that it will be used in prosecution and (if it mattered, which of 
course I do not think it should) Officer understands that as 
well.  But just as clearly, the statement seems informal – or, 
alternatively, it cannot be considered formal without robbing 
that term of all meaning.  Finally, it seems obvious that this 
type of statement should not be admitted against Suspect if he 
never has an opportunity to cross-examine Witness.  And – 
here is the crucial part – it is inadmissible not despite the lack 
of formality but, one may say, in large part because of it. 
What formalities is this statement missing?  Most 
notable are the presence of the accused and the opportunity for 
him to cross-examine.  Those, of course, are the essence of the 
confrontation right.  Clearly, the logic could not be that because 
of their absence the statement is informal and therefore the 
confrontation right does not apply, because that is a Catch-22 
that would prevent the right from ever applying.  Apart from 
those two, the most obvious formality is the oath.  But we 
already know from Crawford itself that the absence of the oath 
will not make the statement non-testimonial; the majority 
  
 58 I could make the same point by using the actual situation addressed by the 
decision of the Sixth Circuit in United States v. Cromer, 389 F.3d 662, 666-68 (6th Cir. 
2004), which rejected a formality requirement. Id. at 673-74. 
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opinion was quite explicit on this point,59 and the statement at 
issue in that case was not given under oath.  There are other 
formalities as well that usually accompany testimony – the 
question-and-answer format and the general ceremonial nature 
of the courtroom – but these are of lesser importance; I have 
already explained in Part VIII why I do not believe 
interrogation is necessary to make a statement testimonial. 
In short, the absence of formalities does not render a 
statement non-testimonial; rather, the absence of the most 
important formalities may make unacceptable as evidence a 
statement that is testimonial in nature.  This casts a helpful 
light on dictionary definitions, like the one quoted by Crawford, 
that include formality as a component of testimony: Formality 
is an ideal, an aspect of testimony given in the optimal way, at 
trial in open court.  The purpose of the Confrontation Clause, 
indeed, is to ensure that testimony be given in an acceptably 
formal way, in the presence of the accused and subject to cross-
examination, and if reasonably possible at an open trial.  To 
say that the absence of formality takes a statement that would 
otherwise be deemed testimonial outside the purview of the 
Clause would be to treat a defect of the statement as a virtue.  
It would also give investigating officers precisely the wrong 
incentive.  They would tend to avoid whatever procedure is 
deemed to be a critical aspect of formality, so that statements 
given to them in full anticipation of evidentiary use would then 
be deemed non-testimonial and outside the rule of Crawford. 
Once again, simply because this factor, formality, is not 
required to make a statement testimonial does not mean that it 
is irrelevant in determining whether the statement is 
testimonial – that is, roughly speaking, that it was made in 
anticipation of prosecutorial use.  For example, in Crawford the 
statement was videotaped, with an introduction by the 
investigating officer that left no doubt about why the statement 
was being taped.  But when a witness to a completed crime 
knowingly makes a statement to the police or other authorities 
describing the crime, the statement should be deemed 
testimonial, no matter how informally it was taken, because 
the likely evidentiary use is so clear.  The presence of 
formalities can reinforce that determination, but they are not 
necessary to it. 
  
 59 See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52-53 n.3 (“We find it implausible that a 
provision which concededly condemned trial by sworn ex parte affidavit thought trial by 
unsworn ex parte affidavit perfectly OK.”) (emphasis in original). 
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X. EXCITED TESTIMONY 
Before Crawford, the decision in White v. Illinois,60 
treating the hearsay exception for spontaneous declarations as 
a “firmly rooted” one for purposes of applying the reliability 
test of Roberts and holding that the unavailability requirement 
of Roberts did not apply to them,61 gave a green light to 
prosecutors and courts to try cases by introducing statements 
made in 911 calls and to responding officers, even if the 
declarant did not testify.  This is a practice that Bridget 
McCormack and I have called “dial-in testimony.”62 
Allowing this kind of evidence made it possible to try 
domestic violence cases by using the complainant’s description 
of the incident, even without the complainant having testified 
in front of the accused.  Many courts and prosecutors engaged 
in domestic violence cases give this practice a euphemistic 
name – “evidence-based prosecutions” – that is extraordinarily 
ironic, like the names of the Ministries of Love, Peace, and 
Truth in 1984:  These prosecutions are most notable for the 
critical evidence that they lack, testimony given by the 
complainant subject to cross-examination.  Since Crawford, 
many courts have continued operating essentially as they did 
before.  Indeed, I believe that some courts and prosecutors who 
are actively engaged in domestic violence cases, determined to 
maintain the practice, have adopted a “draw the wagons” 
approach.63 
I believe a sensible view recognizes that just because a 
declarant is excited does not mean that the statement was not 
  
 60 502 U.S. 346 (1992). 
 61 Id. at 356-58. 
 62 See generally Friedman & McCormack, Dial-In, supra note 9, passim.  
 63 For example, consider what happened when the National Council of 
Juvenile and Family Court Judges published in its journal Juvenile Justice Today an 
article by two Florida judges saying that courts could essentially ignore Crawford by 
invoking the excited utterance exception to the rule against hearsay.  Amy Karan & 
David M. Gersten, Domestic Violence Hearsay Exceptions in the Wake of  Crawford v. 
Washington, 13 JUVENILE & FAMILY JUSTICE TODAY, No. 2, at 20 (Summer 2004).  
Bridget McCormack, Jeff Fisher, and I, believing this article reflected a misleading 
ruling of Crawford that would eventually lead to many reversed convictions, wrote a 
response.  The Council has refused to publish this article; it has said that its tone 
would be insulting to the judges who are valued members of the organization.  We have 
expressed mystification about this contention, and have offered to adjust the tone to 
whatever extent necessary, but the Council has declined to change its decision.  It is 
hard for me to perceive this decision as anything but censorship of views the Council 
finds unacceptable.  A link to our essay is posted on The Confrontation Blog under the 
title A Case of Censorship?, http://confrontationright.blogspot.com/ (Feb. 15, 2005, 
17:15 EST). 
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testimonial in nature.  Crawford supports this view.  In 
footnote 8, the Court said that “to the extent the hearsay 
exception for spontaneous declarations existed at all [at the 
time the Sixth Amendment was adopted], it required that the 
statements be made ‘immediat[ely] upon the hurt received, and 
before [the declarant] had time to devise or contrive any thing 
for her own advantage.’”64  In other words, it may be that there 
was no exception at all for spontaneous declarations; it may be 
that statements made contemporaneously with the events at 
issue were admitted only on non-hearsay grounds, as part of 
the events being litigated – as part of the res gestae, in the 
phrase usually now considered discredited.  Certainly, nothing 
like the latter-day exception for excited utterances existed – 
and the reason presumably was recognition that narrative 
statements by victims of completed crimes almost certainly are 
made with anticipation of prosecutorial use, even though they 
may be made for other purposes as well. 
I believe 911 calls provide some very close decisions; 
statements to responding officers are almost universally 
testimonial.  I will adhere to the summary that Bridget 
McCormack and I have previously provided: 
The more the statement narrates events, rather than merely asking 
for help, the more likely it is to be considered testimonial. 
Thus, if any significant time has passed since the events it describes, 
the statement is probably testimonial.  When, as is often the case, 
the 911 call consists largely of a series of questions by the operator, 
and responses by the caller, concerning not only the current incident 
but the history of the relationship, the caller’s statements should be 
considered testimonial.  When O.J. Simpson called 911 to report an 
assault by his girlfriend, his call was testimonial, not a plea for 
urgent protection. 
Often, of course, a 911 call is such a plea.  Even in this type of 
situation, a court should closely scrutinize the call.  To the extent the 
call itself is part of the incident being tried, the fact of the call 
presumably should be admitted so the prosecution can present a 
coherent story about the incident.  But even in that situation, the 
need to present a coherent story does not necessarily justify 
admitting the contents of the call.  And even if the circumstances do 
warrant allowing the prosecution to prove the contents of the call, 
those contents generally should not be admitted to prove the truth of 
what they assert.  If the contents of the call are probative on some 
ground other than to prove the truth of the caller’s report of what 
  
 64 541 U.S. at 58 n.8 (quoting Thompson v. Trevanion, 90 Eng. Rep. 179 (K.B. 
1694)). 
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has happened, then admissibility should be limited to such other 
ground.  To the extent that the contents of the call are significant 
only as the caller’s report of what has happened, such a report 
usually should be considered testimonial.65 
XI. CHILDREN 
Children presented some of the most difficult issues 
under the Roberts regime, and they will continue to do so under 
Crawford.  In a pre-Crawford article, I have discussed at some 
length how a testimonial approach might apply to children’s 
statements in various contexts.66  Here I will offer only some 
brief comments; I freely admit that my thought in this area 
remains unsettled. 
I tend to believe that some very young children should 
be considered incapable of being witnesses for Confrontation 
Clause purposes.  Their understanding is so undeveloped that 
their words ought to be considered more like the bark of a 
bloodhound than like the testimony of an adult witness.  And 
perhaps, in accordance with Sherman Clark’s theory, we 
should consider that morally they are so undeveloped that we 
do not want to impose on them the responsibility of being 
witnesses.67 
Even assuming a child is considered capable of being a 
witness, there remains the question of whether a particular 
statement should be considered testimonial.  Here, the 
question of whether to take an objective or subjective view in 
determining whether a statement is testimonial becomes 
important.  If the matter is viewed objectively, it probably does 
not make much sense to apply a “reasonable child” standard, 
and some courts that have confronted the issue have declined 
to do so.68  That is, an objective standard puts aside the 
  
 65 Friedman & McCormack, Dial-In, supra note 9, at 1242-43. 
 66 Richard D. Friedman, The Conundrum of Children, Confrontation, and 
Hearsay, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 243 (Winter 2002). 
 67 See Clark, supra note 36, at 1280-85. 
 68 People v. Sisavath, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753, 758 n.3 (Ct. App. 2004) (holding 
that, though Crawford’s reference to an “objective witness” could mean “an objective 
witness in the same category of persons as the actual witness – here, an objective four 
year old,” the more likely meaning is “that if the statement was given under 
circumstances in which its use in a prosecution is reasonably foreseeable by an 
objective observer, then the statement is testimonial.”); State v. Grace, 111 P.3d 28, 38 
(Haw. Ct. App. 2005); but see State v. Scacchetti, 690 N.W.2d 393, 396 (Minn. App. 
2005), review granted (Minn. Mar. 29, 2005) (holding that to invoke Crawford the 
defendant must show that “the circumstances surrounding the contested statements 
led the [child victim] to reasonably believe her disclosures would be available for use at 
a later trial, or that the circumstances would lead a reasonable child of her age to have 
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particular incapacities of the given declarant, and it is not clear 
why youth and immaturity should be treated differently from 
other incapacities.  On the other hand, there is something a 
little odd about asking, with respect to a statement by a young 
child, what the anticipation of a reasonable adult would be.  If 
a subjective test is used, I do not believe the proper question for 
children should be whether the child anticipated prosecutorial 
use in the sense of the formal procedures of the criminal justice 
system.  It should be enough if the child understood that she 
was reporting wrongdoing and that some adverse consequences 
– including that Mommy would get mad – would be visited on 
the wrongdoer. 
Another wrinkle is worth considering if a subjective test 
is used, embellishing it with an estoppel rule: An investigator 
should not be able to withhold information about the likely use 
of the statement gratuitously for the purpose of being able to 
contend that the statement was made without testimonial 
understanding.69  That rule seems to me to be correct as a 
matter of principle; whether it would be sensibly applied is 
another matter. 
XII. CONCLUSION 
The question of whether a statement should be deemed 
to be testimonial will provide many interesting and perplexing 
issues over the next several years (fodder for Evidence exams!) 
and it will continue to provide at least many close factual 
issues long after that.  But the existence of all these open 
questions, and the possibility of treating them in a wide range 
of ways, should not lead us to believe that Crawford is 
anywhere near as manipulable as Roberts was, or that it did 
not represent a great and beneficial development.  Roberts did 
not articulate a doctrine worthy of respect, and so 
  
that expectation.”); In re D.L., No. 84643, 2005 WL 1119809, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. May 
12, 2005). 
 69 Suppose an investigator has no reasonable fear that revealing to the child 
that she is looking into wrongdoing would inhibit the child from speaking, and yet she 
declines to make the revelation so that the state can contend that the child did not 
anticipate punitive use of her statement.  In that case, the estoppel rule would apply.  
On the other hand, an undercover police officer could decline to reveal her role to a 
conspirator without invoking the estoppel rule, because given such a revelation the 
conspirator presumably would not make statements useful to the officer. 
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manipulation was inevitable.70  Crawford comes at least close 
to articulating the fundamental principle underlying the 
Confrontation Clause, a principle at the heart of our criminal 
justice system – that if a witness testifies against an accused, 
she must do so face to face, subject to oath and cross-
examination.  Crawford instantly made easy some cases – like 
that of Michael Crawford himself – that had divided the lower 
courts.  If the Supreme Court continues to hold the line, lower 
courts will have to listen.  They will realize that there is a wide 
range of conceivable ways in which witnesses can testify – 
some formal, others not; some to government officers, others 
not; some in response to questioning, others not; some after 
calm reflection, others not.  The Confrontation Clause has a 
simple but strong demand: Prosecution testimony must be 
given face to face with the accused, subject to cross-
examination. 
  
 70 Acknowledging “interim uncertainty” created by its adoption of a new 
standard, the Crawford Court noted that “the Roberts test is inherently, and therefore 
permanently, unpredictable.”  541 U.S. at 68 n.10. 
